The UK government has said Brexit will not mean a return to the hard border.  According to Theresa May, then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and Irish Prime Minister Enda Kenny in 2016, this agreement should be maintained after the UK`s withdrawal from the EU.  Since about 2005, the border has been considered invisible, with little or no physical infrastructure, as security barriers and checkpoints have been removed as a result of processes introduced by the Good Friday Agreement (or “Belfast Agreement”), signed in 1998.    This agreement has the status of both an international treaty between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland (the Anglo-Irish Agreement) and an agreement between the parties in Northern Ireland (multi-party agreement). Relationship with Dublin: Brexit has tarnished Dublin`s relationship with London amid a long battle over The Brexit deal. Memories of the riots have faded in England, Despite decades of deadly terrorist attacks, some British politicians have sparked outrage with comments revealing their ignorance of Northern Ireland`s sensitive sensitivities.22 British and Irish diplomats will have to find new ways to structure their engagement on common political interests, as the UK`s exit from the European Union means that officials will no longer regularly interact at Brussels meetings. After Brexit, the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland becomes an external border of the EU.  In theory, a “hard” border could return, both with fewer and monitored border crossing points, to support the necessary customs infrastructure.  Both the EU and UK negotiating teams have made it clear that this result will not be acceptable in any final withdrawal agreement.   When MEPs mentioned the agreement and what would be the rejection of the backstop, they were primarily defending only part of the historical conflict – the Unionist side that supports Northern Ireland`s political ties with Britain. Economy: Brexit will create economic challenges for Northern Ireland. Agriculture is the most complex sector, accounting for 35% of the region`s exports (almost a quarter of exports to Ireland, while less than 2% go the other way).8 Since the UK`s withdrawal from the EU UNION internal market is on an island basis, the UK`s exit from the EUROPEAN UNION`s internal market will have an impact on supply chains, processing and migrant workers.
A Brexit without a deal would entail considerable economic risks, including the expected loss of 40,000 jobs and an estimated drop in exports to Ireland from 11 per cent to 19%.9 3 This document is divided into three parts. The first part will show that the current soft regime of the Irish border is inseparable from and dependent on the political and constitutional compromise of 1998, excluding any solution that would be purely commercial and/or technical. Any soft or hard changes in the way border control functions are carried out necessarily destabilizes the political and institutional balance found in 1998, in particular, but not only, in the second part of the GFA. Therefore, the difficulty of the irish border problem after Brexit also lies in the GFA itself. The next two parts focus successively on two major weaknesses of the GFA that make this difficulty.